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In the middle part of the twentieth century, appeals to the way language is used by 
ordinary speakers in everyday circumstances became common among certain 
philosophers. For those philosophers, such appeals were a central part of the way they 
approached philosophical problems and evaluated philosophical theories, both old and 
new. "Ordinary language philosophy" was the term used to designate this style of 
philosophy, and although its practitioners differed in the particulars of their strategies, it 
can be said that they nevertheless formed a movement.  
  
The idea that attention to the ordinary usage of language is important for evaluating 
philosophical theories did not originate with ordinary language philosophy. Note, for 
example, the grounds on which Thomas Reid reprimanded Hume in the following 
passage: 
 
Philosophers ought not to escape censure when they corrupt a language, by using words 
in a way which the purity of language will not admit. I find fault with Mr. Hume's 
phraseology...because he gives the name of perceptions to every operation of the mind. 
Love is a perception, hatred a perception; desire is a perception, will is a perception; 
and, by the same rule, a doubt, a question, a command, is a perception. This is an 
intolerable abuse of language, which no philosopher has authority to introduce. (Reid, 
1983, 144-145) 
 
In fact, the contrast between ordinary ways of using language and philosophical 
discourse has always been noticed by philosophers. What was new in ordinary language 
philosophy was the thoroughgoing commitment among its practitioners to attention to 
the nuances of ordinary language, as a central part of their philosophical method. 
 
Ordinary language philosophy is widely considered to be a failed project. Some 
criticisms of the movement are by now familiar: 
 
_____________________________ 
Corresponding Author: Anthony Coleman 
Willamette University  
email - colemana@willamette.edu 
Essays Philos (2010) 11:2                                                                                    Coleman & Welty | 121 
 
 
• Philosophy is, or should be, concerned with the foundations of 
knowledge, the relation between mind and body, the nature of justice, 
and other such issues, not with what ordinary people think and do. 
 
• Practitioners of ordinary language philosophy fail to distinguish 
between the semantic and pragmatic features of language.   
 
• Practitioners of ordinary language philosophy make claims about how 
'we' use words based solely on how they use words, but such a sample 
size is far too small to yield the wanted results. 
 
The contributors to this volume scrutinize these and other criticisms, while arguing for 
ordinary language philosophy's continued relevance. 
  
In her essay, “Reconsidering Ordinary Language Philosophy: Malcolm’s (Moore’s) 
Ordinary Language Argument”, Sally Parker Ryan reconstructs Norman Malcolm’s 
argument for the claim that ‘ordinary language is correct language.’ Malcolm famously 
made this claim as an interpretation of G. E. Moore’s defense of common sense, an 
interpretation that Moore himself rejected. Taken at face value, Malcolm’s claim seems 
clearly false. But Ryan makes a compelling case that, when understood properly, 
Malcolm’s claim is quite plausible. This constitutes a partial answer to the charge that 
philosophy is or should be about things other than how people ordinarily use language. 
If ordinary language is by and large correct language, then insofar as a philosophical 
position (e.g., skepticism) implies that ordinary language is not correct, that position is 
false.  
  
In his essay, “Is Wittgenstein a Contextualist?”, Alberto Voltolini discovers interesting 
grounds for rejecting the criticism that ordinary language philosophy fails to distinguish 
between pragmatic and semantic aspects of language. Radical contextualists believe 
that the context sensitivity of truth-conditions is a pervasive feature of language. 
Voltolini argues that Wittgenstein was not a contextualist in this sense. Instead, 
Wittgenstein believed that the context-sensitivity of linguistic meaning, conceived of as 
use, is a pervasive feature of language. So, far from ignoring the distinction between 
pragmatics and semantics, Wittgenstein, according to Voltolini, had a sophisticated 
view about the context sensitivity of use and its implications for the nature of meaning.   
  
Paul Grice made a distinction between conditions that are conversationally implicated 
by an assertion that p and conditions that are part of the meaning of p. He also claimed 
that ordinary language philosophers often conflate the two. In his essay, “Grice’s 
Unspeakable Truths”, Jeff Johnson challenges Grice’s view. According to Grice, 
conversational implicatures can be detected through what he called a ‘cancellability’ 
test. Grice claimed that by applying the cancellability test to examples of linguistic 
usage investigated by ordinary language philosophers, it could be shown that those 
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philosophers mistook conversational implicatures for aspects of meaning. Johnson 
argues that Grice’s application of the cancellability test begs the question against 
ordinary language philosophers. He also argues that it’s unclear whether the 
cancellability test is even a reliable way to detect conversational implicatures.  
  
Experimental philosophy has been thought by some to represent an improvement over 
ordinary language philosophy, in particular, a broadening of its evidence base beyond 
the single philosopher consulting his or her own intuitions to the statistically significant 
sample drawn from the general population. In his essay, “The Experimental Turn and 
Ordinary Language", Constantine Sandis challenges this view, arguing that the methods 
of experimental philosophy are not suited to deliver the sorts of results wanted by the 
ordinary language philosopher. According to Sandis, ordinary language philosophy is 
concerned with the norms that govern linguistic usage whereas experimental 
philosophy is concerned with psychological explanations of why people have the 
intuitions they do. The two movements, therefore, do not share the same goal. 
  
Jonathan Trigg, in his paper "The Philosophy of Ordinary Language Is a Naturalistic 
Philosophy", advocates for a sharp distinction between the philosophy of mind and a 
science of the mind. He does so by considering the question of whether psychological 
activities like perceiving, remembering, believing, etc. can be sensibly attributed to 
parts of persons, e.g. brains. He argues that, contrary to the claims of some 
neuroscientists, our ordinary ways of talking about such activities suggest that the 
answer is ‘no’. Trigg considers several objections to the appeal to ordinary language in 
a context that some would consider purely scientific, and makes a strong case that the 
philosophy of mind cannot be divorced from our ordinary talk about the mind.  
  
Taken together, these papers fulfill the editors’ aim of a contemporary reconsideration 
of ordinary language philosophy, and thereby suggest that, as so often in philosophy, 
old lessons are as likely to fall to neglect and change of fashion as they are to superior 
wisdom. 
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